These are the latest child welfare items that should be right on your radar:

• Labor to scrap ‘equal time’ test for parents in custody disputes, with child welfare paramount (Australia)
• Parents with a learning disability are 54 times more likely to have children taken into care, Channel 5 (UK)
• Children in care not a priority for government, says Mark Kerr, deputy CEO at The Children’s Homes Association (UK)

Welcome to another week.

Lexis Nexis has published a very good summary of transparency issues within the family courts, as a new reporting pilot launches today.

We are adding an extract from the summary below, written by Nicholas Fairbank and Olivia Gaunt, both barristers at 4 Paper Buildings. Subscribers can access the summary in full here.

What are the issues?

Proceedings in the family courts are often kept behind closed doors in order to ensure that data and information about families (and, most importantly, children) and their private matters are protected. ChA 1989 proceedings and financial remedy proceedings often occur concurrently. Almost always, both sets of proceedings will involve the same parties, so then the question arises as to whether those parties and/or their legal representatives are prohibited from disclosing the papers from current (or concluded) ChA 1989 proceedings into financial remedy proceedings without the court’s permission, and if so, why?

In light of increased transparency in the financial remedies arena, and more recently the reporting pilot announced by the President of the Family Division, Sir Andrew Macfarlane, on 29 November 2022 (see News Analysis: President of the Family Division announces reporting pilot in three areas) concerning proceedings relating to children, this prohibition only increases in relevance. If confidential information from children proceedings is disclosed into financial remedy proceedings and a judgment in the latter is published, a breach of confidentiality (which, as we set out below, is illegal) can cause real harm. It is therefore timely to address the issue given what we have observed (some of which is therefore anecdotal and arguably subjective) to be an increase in the prevalence of references to and often direct quotations from ChA 1989 proceedings in financial remedy proceedings, including regrettably in counsel’s documentation filed with the court.

What is the legal framework that prohibits disclosure?

ChA 1989 proceedings are covered by section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 (AJA 1960), which states:

‘(1) The publication of information relating to proceedings before any court sitting in private shall not of itself be contempt of court except in the following cases, that is to say—

(a) where the proceedings –

(i) relate to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court with respect to minors;

(ii) are brought under the Children Act 1989 or the Adoption and Children Act 2002; or

(iii) otherwise relate wholly or mainly to the maintenance or upbringing of a minor …’

What constitutes ‘publication’?

There is no statutory definition of publication in this context, however Mr Justice Munby (as he then was) provided a definition in Re B (A Child) (Disclosure) [2004] EWHC 411 (Fam), [2004] 2 FLR 142 (at para [72]), ie:

‘…where there is a communication of information by someone to a professional, each acting in furtherance of the protection of children, there is a ‘publication’ for the purposes of [AJA 1960, s 12] whenever the law of defamation would treat there as being a publication. I recognise that this means that most forms of dissemination, whether oral or written, will constitute a publication, but I do not shrink from that.’

This definition was cited with apparent approval by the Court of Appeal in Griffiths v Tickle and Others (Rights of Women and Another Intervening) [2022] EWCA Civ 465, [2022] 2 FLR 879.

What constitutes ‘information’?

Munby J, again in Re B (A Child) (Disclosure) [2004] EWHC 411 (Fam), [2004] 2 FLR 142, provided a non-exhaustive list (at para [66]) of what constitutes information, saying:

‘What is it that cannot be published?

In the first place it is quite clear that the effect of [AJA 1960, s 12] is to prohibit the publication of accounts of what has gone on in front of the judge sitting in private, as also the publication of documents such as affidavits, witness statements, reports, position statements, skeleton arguments or other documents filed in the proceedings, transcripts or notes of the evidence or submissions, and transcripts or notes of the judgment. (I emphasise that this list is not necessarily exhaustive.) [AJA 1960, s 12] likewise prohibits the publication of extracts or quotations from such documents: Official Solicitor v News Group Newspapers and Another [1994] 2 FLR 174; also the publication of summaries: X v Dempster [1999] 1 FLR 894 at p898. It is also quite clear, in my judgment, that the prohibition in [AJA 1960, s 12] applies equally whether or not the information or the document being published has been anonymised.’

In the main judgment in Griffiths v Tickle [2021] EWCA Civ 1882, [2021] All ER (D) 85 (Dec), the court provided a similar list (at para [43]), ie:

‘[AJA 1960, s 12(1)] makes provision about the publication of information about such proceedings. This covers the publication of accounts of what has gone on in front of the judge, and the publication of documents such as transcripts of judgments, witness statements, reports, position statements, skeleton arguments or other documents filed in the proceedings.’

Therefore, for the purposes of AJA 1960, s 12, most of the papers from ChA 1989 proceedings will constitute information which cannot be published.

In X v Dempster [1999] 1 FLR 894 (at p898-899), Mr Justice Wilson provided the following list, which includes orders, and sets out what can be published and is not prohibited, unless subject to a specific order prohibiting publication:

•the fact that a child is a ward of court and is the subject of wardship proceedings, and:

◦the name, address or photograph of such a child (per Re W and Others (Wards) (Publication of Information) [1989] 1 FLR 246, at p257H), and

◦the name, address or photograph of the parties (or, if the child is a party, the other parties) to such proceedings (per Re De Beaujeu’s Application for Writ of Attachment Against Cudlipp [1949] 1 All ER 439)

•that a child is the subject of residence (as it then was) or other proceedings under ChA 1989 or of proceedings relating wholly or mainly to their maintenance or upbringing (per Re W and Others (Wards) (Publication of Information) [1989] 1 FLR 246, at p257H)

•the date, time or place of a past or future hearing in such proceedings (Pickering v Liverpool Daily Post and Echo Newspapers plc and Another [1991] 1 All ER 622, per Lord Bridge of Harwich at p423D–F)

•the nature of the dispute in such proceedings (Pickering, at p423F–G)

•anything which has been seen or heard by a person who was conducting themselves lawfully ‘in the public corridor or other public precincts outside the court in which the hearing in private is taking place’ (Re W and Others, at p257G–H), and

•the text or summary of the whole or part of any order made in such proceedings (AJA 1960, s 12(2))

In relation to the fact of proceedings, in Griffiths v Tickle and Others (Rights of Women and Another Intervening) [2022] EWCA Civ 465, [2022] 2 FLR 879 the court cited P v Liverpool Post and Echo Newspapers plc [1991] 1 All ER 622, which said that there is ‘nothing objectionable about disclosure of the mere existence of such proceedings’ (at para [26]). Indeed, parties to financial remedy proceedings are routinely required, when completing their Form E, to include ‘details of any other court cases between you and your spouse/civil partner, whether in relation to money, property, children or anything else’ (section 1.15, Form E).

What are the relevant provisions in the Family Procedure Rules 2010?

‘Publication’ (as defined) is not specifically permitted by the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (FPR 2010), SI 2010/2955. FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, r 12.73(1)(a) states that for the purposes of the law relating to contempt of court, information relating to proceedings held in private (whether or not contained in a document filed with the court) may be communicated where the communication is to:

•a party

•the legal representative of a party

•a professional legal adviser

•an officer of the service or a Welsh family proceedings officer

•the welfare officer

•the Director of Legal Aid Casework (within the meaning of section 4 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012)

•an expert whose instruction by a party has been authorised by the court for the purposes of the proceedings

•a professional acting in furtherance of the protection of children, or

•an independent reviewing officer appointed in respect of a child who is, or has been, subject to proceedings to which this rule applies

In addition, FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, r 12.73(1)(b)-(c) provide that information may be communicated where the court gives permission, or (subject to any direction of the court) in accordance with FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, r 12.75 and FPR 2010, PD 12G.

As FPR 2010 does not specifically make provision for disclosure of ChA 1989 proceedings papers into financial remedies proceedings, publication of information from ChA 1989 proceedings is not authorised by FPR 2010 and, unless permission is given by the court, may amount to a contempt of court.

What is the position where ChA 1989 proceedings are ongoing?

In relation to ChA 1989 proceedings which have not yet concluded, the protection comes from ChA 1989, s 97(2), which states that:

‘No person shall publish [to the public at large or any section of the public] any material which is intended, or likely, to identify—

(a) any child as being involved in any proceedings before the High Court or the family court in which any power under this Act or the Adoption and Children Act 2002 may be exercised by the court with respect to that or any other child; or

(b) an address or school as being that of a child involved in any such proceedings.’

For a comprehensive summary of the relevant provisions and legal background, see also Confidentiality and (un)authorised disclosures of Children Act documents for use in Financial Remedy proceedings [2022] Fam Law 762.

What are recent developments as to transparency in the family courts?

The President’s report in October 2021, ‘Confidence and Confidentiality: Transparency in the Family Courts’ discussed the challenges of ‘squaring the circle’ in managing the juxtaposing needs of ensuring all parties’ confidentiality and identities are kept private, while implementing steps to boost confidence in the family courts. The President argued that the current system fails to allow public scrutiny or accountability and that reform is necessary to increase transparency, without compromising the anonymity of the families and children involved in cases.

The transparency reporting pilot is up and running, for a period of 12 months from 30 January 2023. The designated courts are in three parts of the country (Cardiff, Leeds and Carlisle), with a view to a nationwide expansion if successful. The pilot relates specifically to children proceedings.

Under the pilot, accredited journalists and ‘legal bloggers’ (ie ‘duly authorised lawyers’ for the purposes of FPR 2010, SI 2010/2955, r 27.11) will be permitted to report what they see and hear in designated family courts, subject to a transparency order. In each case, the court will consider whether to make a transparency order but will retain discretion to direct that there should be no reporting of a particular case. The standard transparency order directs that, among other details, the name of any subject child, parent or other family member who is a party or is mentioned in the case, or whose name may lead to the child being identified, cannot be reported unless the court grants express permission. Crucially, a transparency order does not permit the parties themselves to publish information from the proceedings where it would otherwise be restricted by AJA 1960, s 12 and/or FPR 2010 (ie into financial remedy proceedings).

See also the decision in BR & Others (Transparency Order: Finding of Fact Hearing) [2023] EWFC 9, a public law children case in the Family Court at Leeds, in which Mr Justice Poole made reference to the commencement of the reporting pilot in that court regarding a finding of fact hearing expected to last for eleven weeks. With the pilot due to begin approximately two weeks after the beginning of the hearing, Poole J thought it appropriate to adopt the pilot from the outset of the hearing rather than to do so two weeks after the case had begun.

Following on from our post on Wednesday about the Channel 5 news feature looking at unjust removals of children from disabled mothers by social services, we’re sharing the full length interview with mother Jean Eveleigh and her child Tye, who is now an adult.

The segment was produced with the help of Legal Action for Women and the Disabled Mothers’ Rights Campaign.

The entire interview is worth watching, and there are several very powerful moments during the segment. We were left heartbroken by many of the memories they shared, including Jean’s routine of calling up social services every time a terror attack took place in the UK, to find out if her daughter had been in the vicinity at the time of the event.

You can watch the full interview here.

These are the latest child welfare items that should be right on your radar:

• Burnley Dad jailed for life for murdering baby son Abel-Jax by violent shaking
• 200 unaccompanied children still missing after disappearing from Home Office hotels
• Bristol Council SEND ‘spying’ scandal sees no date set for probe

Channel 5 News is airing a documentary at 5pm this afternoon about the discrimination faced by disabled mothers in Britain’s family courts which can lead to the removal of their children. The documentary consulted with Legal Action for Women (LAW) and the Disabled Mothers’ Rights Campaign.

The following is a press release issued by the two organisations:

We worked with Channel 5 News on its news feature today which found that parents with a learning disability are 54 times more likely to have their children taken into care.  This confirms our experience of the discrimination and hostility faced by disabled mothers, and other single, working class and mothers of colour who face an uphill battle to stop social workers and the family courts taking our children from us.

Ch5 spoke to a mother and daughter, now reunited after forced adoption, who are part of the Disabled Mothers’ Rights Campaign – the full interview will be on our blog after 6pm.  Jean said, “Time was stolen from us where we’re being punished for something that was not my fault. And we now have a lot of work to try to do, to try and get to that normal parent child relationship.”

Tye told 5 News, “That was a good 18 years. That’s my whole existence. I can’t get that back.  But I could have had her growing up. I could have had someone that fought for me relentlessly, and I didn’t get that, and I should have. It’s infuriating.”

Tracey Norton, coordinator for the Disabled Mothers’ Rights Campaign, run by campaign group WinVisible told 5News: “A Social worker is automatically looking for safeguarding, and disability is seen as a safeguarding issue when it shouldn’t be.

“Our message is that we want money for mothers, particularly disabled mothers, so that we can care for their children in the community, so that we can get the right resources that they need, and the children don’t need to be taken into care. And it causes trauma that’s never ending. It will never, ever go away for either the child or the mother. It’s lifelong. “

Anne Neale from Support Not Separation adds:

“Our experience is that mothers are targeted for child removal by sexism, racism, disability discrimination and pervasive class bias in the “child protection” system and in family courts:  Of 248 mothers with 446 children we worked with over the past two years, 94% were single mothers, mostly on low incomes; 40% were women of colour and/or immigrant; 42% had mental health issues and 17% had a physical disability, which was used against them.  83% had suffered domestic violence; nearly all were fighting over contact with their children and over half the mothers had had their children removed.”

There are now over 82,170 children in state “care” and millions are being poured into private companies which dominate a fostering and adoption industry.  Some multinationals charge Councils up to £1m a year to keep a child in “care”.  Given these figures the problem cannot be reduced to  cuts: the problem is that mothers and children are impoverished and discriminated against, refused the support we are entitled to.  It’s easier to take our kids than to challenge the child welfare industry. 

We are calling for a complete overhaul of Children’s Social Care to prioritise support to mothers and other primary carers to keep children and families together and demanding a Care Income for mothers (and other carers) who do the work of caring for and raising children.

For information & interviews: 0207 482 2496/07925195758

Many thanks to LAW for sharing this press release with us.

Britain’s first parent-led Truth Commission looking at children’s social care is holding its monthly Zoom meeting today, Tuesday 24th January from 5pm to 6pm.

Attendees can get involved with the work of the commission and ask its members any questions they wish about the commission during these calls. We’d love you to join us.

This month we’re holding our regular session for families affected by the child protection system, in which we share updates about the Commission’s work and ask for your feedback and suggestions.

In addition to our usual agenda, we will also be asking families and all other attendees what you would like the commission to focus on in 2023.

During the event you will also be able to ask the commission’s lead Michele Simmons, and commission team members Simon Haworth and Natasha Phillips (Researching Reform) questions about the commission’s current projects.

The call will take place today from 5pm to 6pm on Zoom.

If you would like to attend the event, please email the team at truthcommissionuk@gmail.com. The team will also give you information about how to access the conference.

Please confirm you would like to attend the event in your message, and let us know if you are a care-experienced child or parent, social care stakeholder, government affiliate, academic, journalist or member of the public.

We look forward to welcoming you.

Additional links:

• Commission website
• Current available guides
• Free Booklet: Children and their families have rights
• Families’ testimonials

The Children and Families Truth Commission (CFTC) has published a guide offering information about registered intermediaries, who can be used to help families going through the family courts.

The guide has been written by Gem (not her real name), a parent with family court experience, who is an expert on the use of registered intermediaries and how they can help families communicate with people in the court process, and understand the process itself.

You can open the guide by clicking on the image below, or you can access it through the Commission’s Guides Page.

The leaflet can also be read alongside the Commission’s Rights Booklet, which has information about how to protect your rights and your child’s rights during child protection investigations.

The commission would like to thank Gem very much for writing this guide for the commission.

Welcome to another week.

These are the latest child welfare items that should be right on your radar:

• Northern Ireland’s forced adoption investigation lands on Australian shores
• Commission on Young Lives: National plan for vulnerable young people
• Sefton Council makes ‘Care Experienced’ a protected characteristic

Britain’s first parent-led Truth Commission looking at children’s social care is holding its monthly Zoom meeting on Tuesday 24th January from 5pm to 6pm.

Attendees can get involved with the work of the commission and ask its members any questions they wish about the commission during these calls. We’d love you to join us.

This month we’re holding our regular session for families affected by the child protection system, in which we share updates about the Commission’s work and ask for your feedback and suggestions.

In addition to our usual agenda, we will also be asking families and all other attendees what you would like the commission to focus on in 2023.

During the event you will also be able to ask the commission’s lead Michele Simmons, and commission team members Simon Haworth and Natasha Phillips (Researching Reform) questions about the commission’s current projects.

The call will take place on Tuesday 24th January from 5pm to 6pm on Zoom.

If you would like to attend the event, please email the team at truthcommissionuk@gmail.com. The team will also give you information about how to access the conference.

Please confirm you would like to attend the event in your message, and let us know if you are a care-experienced child or parent, social care stakeholder, government affiliate, academic, journalist or member of the public.

We look forward to welcoming you.

Additional links:

• Commission website
• Current available guides
• Free Booklet: Children and their families have rights
• Families’ testimonials

An interesting judgment has been published, which says that voluntary accommodation for children engaging with child protection services can be provided and used instead of care orders, and for as long as needed.

Lady Justice King’s judgment should be read with caution, because while it says that families are able to use this form of accommodation long-term instead of a care order, it also suggests that local authorities could use these agreements to move a child across to a care order – which when done a certain way is illegal.

Section 20 agreements allow children to stay in local authority accommodation for a variety of reasons, including needing a break from their parents (or respite for the parents), and in situations where a professional takes a legitimate view that a child may need to be removed temporarily from her or his parents for their emotional and physical wellbeing.

The agreements came under fire in 2015 after councils were found to have been using them illegally to secure care orders: councils were telling parents that they could not remove their children from the accommodation, and that they had to sign the agreement by law, which was incorrect. The then president of the Family Division, James Munby, issued guidance on the agreements to try and stop the malpractice.

Furthermore, parents were not being told that the agreements were voluntary, required their full and informed consent, and that children could leave the accommodation whenever they wanted and without notice. They were also not being told that they had a right to get the agreement reviewed by a lawyer or trusted friend before signing. Parents can remove their children whenever they want from the accommodation, also without notice.

An additional section of the judgment seems to imply that whenever a disagreement between parents and the LA arises prior to an adoption order being made, the LA has an automatic right to “trump” the parents – but this is not correct.

Parents keep parental responsibility for their child throughout care proceedings and child protection investigations, and only lose it when an adoption order is made. If a care order is made in court, parents and the LA share PR, EQUALLY. Any critical disagreement about a child that cannot be resolved has to be resolved by a judge in court. The LA doesn’t have a blanket “trump” card.

The misunderstanding seems to stem from Section 33(3)(b)(i) of the Children Act 1989, which says the following about instances where a child becomes the subject of a care order:

(3) While a care order is in force with respect to a child, the local authority designated by the order shall—
(a) have parental responsibility for the child; and
(b) have the power (subject to the following provisions of this section) to determine the extent to which [F1—
(i) a parent, guardian or special guardian of the child; or
(ii) a person who by virtue of section 4A has parental responsibility for the child,] may meet his parental responsibility for him.
(4) The authority may not exercise the power in subsection (3)(b) unless they are satisfied that it is necessary to do so in order to safeguard or promote the child’s welfare.

While case law has confirmed that issues like vaccination are generally in the hands of the LA in this context, there are clearly exceptions to the LA’s power, particularly where a disagreement about whether a proposal by the LA is in the best interests of a child, which can be challenged under Subsection (4) above.

And while the section says the LA has parental responsibility for a child in this context, it doesn’t clarify that it SHARES that PR equally with the parents.

There is a helpful summary of the case on Local Government Lawyer, (LGL), an extract of which we’re adding below:

The Court of appeal has allowed two appeals which concerned the interplay between care orders and the voluntary accommodation of children under section 20 of the Children Act 1989.

In Re S (a child) and Re W (a child) [2023] EWCA Civ 1, Lady Justice King, with whom Lord Justice Warby and Lord Justice Arnold agreed, considered whether and in what circumstances, the threshold criteria having been established and there being in place an agreed care plan, the court should decline to make an order under section 31 CA 1989 and instead make no order in accordance with the ‘no order’ principle.

Re S was an appeal against the order of HHJ Atkins of 24 June 2022 whereby he ordered that a child S, aged 9 years, should be made the subject of a care order in favour of a London borough.

Re W was an appeal against the order of HHJ Coffey dated 16 June 2022 whereby she ordered that a girl W, aged 15 years, should be made the subject of a care order in favour of a county council.

The children in each case were beyond parental control, a finding which Lady Justice King noted “does not necessarily mean that the parents are culpable in any way”.

The appellants argued that the children could be accommodated on a long-term basis under section 20.

In Re S, the grounds of appeal filed following the making of the care order by HHJ Atkins were summarised by Lady Justice King as follows:

i) The judge wrongly concluded that a section 31 CA 1989 order was necessary and proportionate on the basis that there was a ‘significant risk’ that S’s father may withdraw his support for section 20 accommodation in the future, S’s father has been difficult to contact and communicate with and there have been contact difficulties in the past.

ii) The judge erred when stating that the issue was ‘do the local authority need to share parental responsibility?’.

iii) The judge attached excessive weight to the certainty that would be provided by a care order. He failed to express a view as to whether section 20 CA 1989 orders could be used for long term accommodation.

iv) Judicial guidance would be of benefit as to the test to be applied where it is submitted that the section 1(5) CA 1989 ‘no order’ principle should be adopted in preference to section 31.

In Re W, the grounds of appeal against the order of HHJ Coffey were summarised as follows:

i) The judge erred in determining that the proper use and purpose of section 20 CA 1989 is for short-term and temporary accommodation when the provisions of the CA 1989 do not restrict or qualify the use of section 20 CA 1989 accommodation in such a way.

ii) Having determined the above, the judge erred in attaching substantial weight and reliance on that determination as the primary reason for making a care order.

iii) The judge erred in considering that she was able to influence or fetter the local authority’s exercise of its parental responsibility during the care order or, in the alternative, placed weight on this consideration as part of her welfare and decision-making evaluation.

iv) The judge erred in concluding that the no order principle and least interventionist approach was rebutted in the circumstances of this case and in failing to identify, or identify properly, the welfare benefits to the child of her parents retaining sole parental responsibility.

Lady Justice King said it was helpful to understand not just the limits of a section 20 order, but also how it differs from a care order.

Deirdre Fottrell KC, acting on behalf of the appellant in Re S, had summarised it by saying that a section 31 care order is the more “draconian order” and more “interventionist”.

“This is undoubtedly the case as not only does a local authority acquire parental responsibility pursuant to section 33(3)(a) CA 1989 when a care order is made, but also under section 33(3)(b)(i) CA 1989 the local authority may ‘determine the extent to which a parent may meet his or her parental responsibility’ for the child in question,” Lady Justice King said.

Lady Justice King summarised the parameters of section 20 accommodation:

i) Parents may ask the local authority to accommodate a child as part of the services they provide for children in need: Williams & Another v London Borough of Hackney [2018] UKSC 37, [2018] AC 421 at para. [41].

ii) A local authority cannot provide accommodation if any person who has parental responsibility and is able to provide or arrange for accommodation to be provided for the child objects: section 20(7).

iii) There is no statutory limit upon the duration of an order for accommodation made under section 20. That this is the case was confirmed in Williams v Hackney LBC at para.[49].

iv) Whilst a person with parental responsibility may not surrender or transfer any part of their parental responsibility, they may delegate it by arranging for some or all of it to be met by one or more persons on their behalf: section 2(9) CA 1989. In agreeing to the making of a section 20 order a parent is ‘simply delegating the exercise of her parental responsibility to the local authority for the time being’: Williams v Hackney LBC at para. [39].

v) Any person with parental responsibility may at any time remove the child from the accommodation: section 20(8).

vi) If there is a child arrangements order naming a person with whom the child is to live and that person agrees to the child being accommodated, then no other person with parental responsibility may either object to the placement under section 20(7) or remove the child from the accommodation under section 20(8).

Lady Justice King went on to consider the leading authority on the use of s.20 CA 1989, Williams & Another v London Borough of Hackney [2018] UKSC 37, [2018] AC 421, in which Baroness Hale had set out nine points in relation to the proper use and effect of orders under section 20 [see paras 38 and 49].

Baroness Hale had concluded her analysis by saying that:

“50. Thus, although the object of section 20 accommodation is partnership with the parents, the local authority have also to be thinking of the longer term. There are bound to be cases where that should include consideration of whether or not the authority should seek to take parental responsibility for an accommodated child by applying for a care order”.

On the improper use of section 20, Baroness Hale had emphasised at para [51], that ‘section 20 must not be used in a coercive way; if the state is to intervene compulsorily in family life, it must seek legal authority to do so’.

Researching Reform has written extensively about Section 20 agreements, so anyone looking for more information can type Section 20 into the site’s search bar, and everything pops up. We are adding a checklist we published below, for anyone wanting a quick recap:

• Section 20 arrangements are voluntary – this means that the local authority cannot place a child in alternative accommodation unless parents agree to the arrangement.
•  You are entitled to be fully informed – the local authority must offer you as much information as you need, in a clear and accessible format
• If you have parental responsibility for a child, you can remove your child from accommodation provided by or on behalf of the local authority at any time
• If a child is 16 or 17, they can leave the accommodation without parental consent
• Always ask for a S.20 arrangement to be put into writing – something this important shouldn’t be set up on word of mouth. If anyone refuses to put this agreement in writing, tell them you have the support of the President Of The Family Division
• Children have a right to be heard – any child who wants to express their wishes and feelings in writing is entitled to do so under a S.20 agreement, and to have those views taken on board by the local authority
• A S.20 arrangement should never be used to secure care proceedings – local authorities do not have the right to put you off terminating a S.20 by giving you the impression that it’s final or compulsory